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A national security tool is supposed to be able to support national security. It is this premise that makes 
the alleged, attempted assassination of a Hamas leader, Khaled Mashaal, by Israeli agents of the Mossad 
controversial to so many diplomats, government officials, and political and intelligence authorities 
throughout the world. Although there are many arguments that can be made by opponents of the 
alleged attempted assassination, the conclusion of virtually all these argument is that Israeli security 
would not have been supported whether Mashaal was assassinated or not. 
 
These arguments suggest that--either way--Israel would have garnered its resultant political problems 
with Jordan, the Palestinian National Authority, Hamas, and the United States among others. However 
these arguments are based on the source of the successful or unsuccessful assassination becoming 
known. If the clandestine and covert nature of an assassination attempt were successfully protected, 
these arguments can be successfully refuted. The death of a political leader in Jordan can reasonably be 
attributed to intrafactional or interfactional conflict, bad health, "nonpolitical" crime, mistaken identity, 
being in the wrong place at the wrong time, and so on. 
 
An opponent may certainly advance arguments that assassination violates moral and ethical standards 
or that gentlemen don't read each other's mail and kill each other. However, in the case of Khaled 
Mashaal, making political objections more likely masks conflicts of power between the Netanyahu 
administration and its domestic and foreign opponents. (See Amon, M. (1996). Cultural clues: The 
nature of intelligence after Rabin's assassination. Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 9, 1-
15; deMause, L. (1995). Shooting at Clinton, prosecuting O.J., and other sacrificial rituals. Journal of 
Psychohistory, 22, 378-393; Indinopulos, T. (1997). Shin Bet's blind side. International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 10, 91-96; Schemann, S. (October 7, 1997.) Netanyahu remains 
defiant on botched assassination attempt. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com.) (Keywords: 
National Security, Assassination, Israel, Mossad.) 
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